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Abstract  
A health benefits package (HBP) defines the list of publicly provided health services offered by a 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?,WƐĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚachieving universal 
health coverage in low- and middle-income countries. This paper provides an overview of the main 
considerations that arise when designing and implementing an HBP.  
 
The first set of issues relate to the governance of HBPs. The processes for designing and updating the 
HBP should be transparent, consistent, stable and involve consultation with appropriate 
stakeholders. These features can improve public support for the HBP by making decision-makers 
accountable for choices and the HBP process understandable to citizens.  
 
Economic considerations are also paramount when selecting interventions to include in an HBP. The 
value of interventions can be judged on multiple criteria that reflect the various objectives of a 
specific health system. Economic evaluation methods, such as cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), can 
be used to generate evidence on outcomes and costs to help decision makers select a package in 
pursuit of a common health system objective: improving population health. This can yield the list of 
interventions and the optimal size of the HBP budget that maximise health outcomes. 
 
Economic evaluation methods can also be used to consider how additional health system constraints 
and objectives can affect decisions around an HBP. These include commitments to principles of 
equity, limited supply of human resources and equipment, and low levels of implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
Universal health coverage is an objective in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), having 
been explicitly set as one of the targets in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals [1]. 
Universal health coverage entails the provision of a set of health services to all citizens in a 
population, regardless of their economic and social circumstances. This presents a prioritisation 
problem, because resource constraints mean that not all services that offer benefits to patients can 
feasibly be provided. The set of essential services to be provided universally is commonly referred to 
as a health benefits package (HBP). The selection of which services to provide (and finance) has been 
made in different ways and with varying degrees of transparency. Over recent decades, HBPs have 
been designed for use in countries worldwide, from South America [2] to Central Asia [3]. Within the 
East, Central and Southern Africa (ECSA) health community region, HBPs have been adopted by 
Malawi [4], [5], Kenya [6] and Zambia [7]. Three examples are described in Box 1. 
 
Designing an efficient, equitable and sustainable HBP is complex. Some HBPs designed with high 
aspirations and broad commitments to providing universal health coverage have resulted in 
financially unaffordable plans that are unable to deliver on their objectives [8], [9]. In response, a 
process of careful financial planning and an explicit commitment to a clearly and publicly defined set 
of interventions is recommended [10]. This approach can increase the benefits generated by public 
healthcare, by allocating resources to those with the greatest capacity to benefit and ensuring that 
the HBP is financially sustainable. 
 
This briefing paper provides an overview of the main considerations when designing and 
implementing an HBP. Firstly, the HBP policy cycle is described, a useful framework covering the 
whole HBP design process. Next, some key concepts on good governance are presented, along with 
potential political issues that can arise. The remainder of the briefing is dedicated to how methods 
developed in the economic evaluation of health technologies  W namely cost-effectiveness analysis  W 
can be used to develop evidence on what interventions should be included in an HBP. 
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Box 1: Examples of health benefits packages in the east, central and southern Africa region 
 
Malawi 
The Malawian HBP, the Essential Health Package (EHP), was first introduced in 2004 and was most recently 
revised in 2016 as part of the health sector strategic plan for 2017-22 [4]. The EHP was initially funded 
through a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), which pooled funding from government and a number of donors 
into a single account. It is now funded primarily through government funds with targeted assistance from 
donors and other partners. 
 
Earlier iterations of the EHP resulted in overly ambitious packages that far outstripped available resources; 
in 2011, the EHP was costed at $44 per capita despite a budget of $14.50 [11]. In part, this was motivated 
by a desire to encourage international donors to increase their financial commitments; however, it also 
limited the effectiveness of the EHP and created large inequalities in coverage across the population. 
 
The economic analysis supporting the most recent EHP aims to better reflect the costs and opportunity 
costs (i.e. the health gains achieved through other forms of health spending) of providing each intervention, 
including the expected limits on population coverage. This work is covered in more detail in Box 2. 
 
Uganda 
dŚĞhŐĂŶĚĂŶEĂƚŝŽŶĂůDŝŶŝŵƵŵ,ĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞWĂĐŬĂŐĞ ?hED,W ?ǁĂƐĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚ
sector strategic plan for 2001/2-2004/5, and has been updated for each subsequent five year cycle. The 
UNMHCP focuses on providing interventions for those diseases that are responsible for the highest health 
ďƵƌĚĞŶ ?dŚŝƐǇŝĞůĚĞĚƚǁĞůǀĞ ‘ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽďĞ
delivered at each level of health facility; from nutrition monitoring at primary health centres to x-ray 
examinations at general hospitals.  
 
The estimated costs of delivering the UNMHCP has regularly exceeded the available resources: delivery 
costs 2008/9 were estimated at $41.2 per capita, compared to a health budget of $12.5 [12]. The two most 
recent strategic plans did not include specific costing exercises for the UNMHCP. Coverage of the services 
included in the UNMHCP has varied widely, and has been supported by direct grants and support from 
central government and donor organisations [13]. 
 
Tanzania 
The Tanzanian HBP was introduced in 1996. The most recent package, the National Essential Health Care 
Intervention Package (NEHCIP-Tz), is being updated as part of the 2015-2020 health sector strategic plan 
[14] and has replaced the National Package of Essential Health (NPEH). Early efforts focused on establishing 
evidence generation procedures to help identify disease priorities and cost-effective interventions. Burden 
of disease was a key criteria for selecting interventions. 
 
By the 2000s, SWAp funding arrangements were in place to finance the NPEH. However, the introduction of 
vertical, donor financed programs increased the complexity of costing the package [15]. Rather than an 
explicit set of interventions, the NPEH describes a set of priority conditions (such as malaria or 
immunisation). However, the most recent strategic plan introduced proposals for a minimum benefit 
package of services that citizens are legally entitled to access, to be introduced alongside a new national 
health insurance program. The minimum benefit package is informed by a costing exercise that aligns the 
included interventions with available health resources, with the hope of ensuring that full implementation is 
achievable. 
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2. The HBP policy cycle 
The construction and maintenance of an HBP is an iterative process, and is dependent on policy 
choices and the nature of the health system. Glassman and colleagues argue that in order to develop 
a coherent and sustainable process for setting the HBP, ten core steps need to be fulfilled. Figure 1 
ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘,WƉŽůŝĐǇĐǇĐůĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌůŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞŶsteps [10]. We 
briefly discuss each in turn.  
 
 
Figure 1: Ten core steps in health benefits package design defined by Glassman et al. [16] 
 
The first step in the design of the HBP is to define the goals and objectives. The goals should be in 
line with the existing values of the health system and reflect the medical needs of the population. It 
is important that the objectives are feasible, and sustainable over time.  
 
The objectives should be linked to measurable outcomes that can be robustly appraised (step 2). The 
use of performance management approaches such as SMART (specific, measureable, achievable, 
relevant and time-bound) criteria can be beneficial to defining the objectives and the methods of 
appraisal [17] ?/ŶƐƚĞƉ ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐŚĂƉĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ,BP is defined. (i.e. the organisational boundaries of the 
HBP). The shape of the HBP refers to the institutional context in which it operates. An example of 
the type of decision that determines the shape is whether the HBP is system-wide or is limited to a 
subset of services (i.e. HIV or TB programmes). This sets the scope within which decision makers 
then identify priority areas for appraisal. 
 
Steps 4 and 5 are chiefly analytical; they relate to the (i) collection and collation of relevant evidence 
and (ii) the translation of this evidence into outcomes of interest for decision making, such as 
population health benefit and budget impact. Evidence collection can be made transparent by 
utilising the systematic review process, in which the inclusion criteria for evidence are explicit [18]. 
The evidence should be collated for use in appraisal, by assessing relevance and validity (i.e. study 
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design, epidemiologic context, health system integration) and then extracting from the relevant 
studies data for analysis (i.e. outcomes, cost and resource requirements for the intervention, 
comparator, targeted population and potential subgroups). Comparative analysis then evaluates 
potential interventions in terms of budget impact and how each meets the objectives of the HBP. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) methods can inform the selection of interventions based on a 
stated objective, typically improving population health. This is followed by a deliberative phase (step 
6) in which the results of the appraisals are considered by decision-makers and stakeholders. These 
discussions may also serve to redefine or clarify the social values underlying the HBP originally 
defined in step 1. 
 
The deliberations will yield recommendations (step 7) that should then be communicated to policy 
makers at different levels of government and to the wider public  W a key stage in ensuring that the 
HBP process is transparent and legitimate. Step 8 translates these recommendations into routine 
practice by allocating the real health resources to the services defined in the HBP over its life cycle. 
In step 9, the HBP is implemented, which requires management to ensure financial viability and 
institutional stability. This rollout should be monitored continuously to ensure that any issues are fed 
back to improve the HBP in the next planning cycle.  
 
The policy cycle demonstrates how designing an HBP is both a technical and political undertaking 
[19]. Section 2 provides a brief overview of key principles relating to the politics and governance of 
HBPs. Section 3 provides a non-technical overview of the use of CEA in HBP design. 
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3. Governance and political considerations 
3.1 Governance 
Good governance is important for successfully enacting the HBP policy cycle. Three key attributes 
have been identified in successful governance structures: transparency, consistent and stable 
processes, and participatory stakeholder involvement [20].  
 
Transparency is an essential requirement if an HBP is to be accountable to the population it serves. 
This can be achieved through the provision of information on processes, responsibilities, analyses 
and results of the HBP to the general public and stakeholders. Ideally, this information should be 
relevant to these interested parties, readily available, shared in a standardised manner, up-to-date, 
and presented in an understandable way. In Colombia, for example, any changes made to the 
services included in the benefit package are transparently published in an online tool, enabling the 
public to hold the decision makers accountable when the HBP is updated [21].     
 
The decision-making processes also need to be consistent, stable and coherent. Processes should 
not be arbitrarily changed, should not contradict each other, and should be logically ordered and 
intelligible. These attributes should help to ensure long-term commitment from all stakeholders, and 
allow for the fair and equitable treatment of all interest groups. Furthermore, stable processes can 
improve the accuracy of performance measurement and provide more amenable conditions for 
health sector investment. In Chile, for example, many aspects of the HBP are systematically 
reviewed each year, including the selection of benefits, costing exercises, the elicitation of social 
preferences and budget control [22]. By conducting this on a fixed-term basis, the Chilean Ministry 
of Health has created a stable and consistent process for managing the HBP. 
 
Lastly, the HBP process should also include the systematic involvement of relevant stakeholders, 
including health professionals, insurers, health service providers, patients, civil society and the 
pharmaceutical industry. Different types of participation are possible including providing 
information, allowing consultation, active involvement and collaboration. In general, the degree of 
participation should reflect the role and interests of the particular stakeholder, with involvement 
limited to the relevant steps in the policy cycle.  For example, consultation of medical technology 
and pharmaceutical companies may be unnecessary when defining social values and the objectives 
of the HBP, but could be useful at the evidence generation and appraisal stages. 
 
3.2 Political economy 
Theories of political economy can help to analyse some of the political and social challenges 
associated with designing and implementing HBPs [20]. As the resources available for healthcare are 
inevitably limited, but demand is not, healthcare activities are always subject to rationing. These 
rationing decisions invariably involve negotiations between stakeholders, each of whom have 
incentives to direct the design and management of the HBP in line with their interests.  
 
These issues can occur during each step of the policy cycle. Political economy theories highlight the 
following potential problems: 
 
x Veto points describe the stages at which the progression of an HBP policy can be blocked by 
public institutions. Particular attention should be paid to how interest groups interact with 
ƚŚĞƐĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐŽĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ǀĞƚŽƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ? ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐĂŶĚ
consultations.  
x Historical institutionalism helps to place the HBP process in the context of the pre-existing 
institutional structure of a society. The initial design of an HBP, as well as any subsequent 
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updates, should therefore be primed to negotiate resistance from those adversely affected 
from its implementation, for example, pharmaceutical companies or particular patient 
groups. 
x Bureaucratic actors can also influence proceedings in ways not aligned with the broader 
public interest. An understanding of which actors are likely to be affected, as well as their 
personal incentives, can help to mitigate against this potential bias. 
x Political actors may design policies aimed at ensuring electoral victories. This can skew the 
benefits of policies towards groups with higher voter turnout, often those of higher 
socioeconomic position, and impose more of the opportunity costs on less well represented 
groups.  
 
The analysis of the political and economic context can help to ensure that HBP planners better 
understand the motivations behind influential stakeholders, and be equipped to mitigate the 
adverse effects that may arise from them. For example, in Costa Rica a pneumococcal vaccine (PCV) 
was included on the national vaccine list despite the national technical agency recommending 
against its inclusion. Investigations later showed that favourable studies were financed by the 
vaccine manufacturer and that the Minister of Health had received a donation to implement PCV 
campaigns [23].       
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4. Evaluating interventions for HBP 
Determining which interventions should be provided in an HBP represents a major technical 
challenge. The objectives of the healthcare system can be diverse and differ from country to 
country. However, a central goal of nearly all health systems is to improve population health [24]. It 
is this central objective that has been a primary focus of methodological and applied research in 
health economics. The field of economic evaluation, and particularly the framework of CEA, provides 
a set of quantitative tools that estimate the effects of interventions on population health (see 
Appendix A for a primer in CEA). The evidence generated by such analyses can be useful for 
policymakers responsible for designing HBPs [25]. Health care systems may have additional 
objectives, such as improving access to care, increasing financial protection or reducing inequalities 
in health. Analytical methods for evaluating interventions in terms of these objectives have also 
been developed; for example, methods for incorporating inequality concerns into resource 
allocation decisions are discussed in a companion briefing paper [26].   
 
The following sections describe some of the novel considerations that arise when moving from the 
commonly used  ‘ŝŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚĂů ?ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?ŝŶǁhich a set of mutually exclusive interventions 
for a particular condition are evaluated and a decision made on which one to implement, to the 
context of an HBP, in which many interventions for different conditions are typically considered 
across the whole population simultaneously. We describe and discuss some of the issues regarding 
 ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƌƵůĞƐ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽƐƚŝŶŐŽĨƉĂĐŬĂŐĞs. Familiarity with the basic 
concepts of CEA is presumed, which centre on net health benefit as a measure of value.  Net health 
benefit represents the amount of health generated by an intervention less the health opportunity 
cost, i.e. the health which could be generated elsewhere using those same resources; for those 
unacquainted with CEA, an introductory overview is provided in Appendix A. 
 
4.1 Cost-effectiveness analysis for HBP design 
The most widely used application of CEA is to evaluate the adoption of an intervention as a 
 ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ. That is, on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether single interventions are 
added to the list of currently provided care [27]. For this approach to support decisions which are 
consistent with improvements in population health and financially sustainability, the additional 
health benefits of the appraised intervention for a particular patient group must be compared with 
an appropriate estimate of the opportunity cost that reflects how much health can be produced by 
using the same financial resource on other options for different patients.   
 
An alternative method ŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ďŽŽŬƐŚĞůĨ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ[28], which simultaneously identifies all 
interventions to be funded, by ordering the potential interventions from highest to lowest net health 
benefit.  Starting with the intervention that provides the greatest net health benefit per person, 
interventions are selected until the budget is exhausted (demonstrated graphically in Figure 2). If the 
bookshelf approach is applied to all possible interventions and for all available healthcare resource, 
it determines how much health is produced with available resources. The informational 
requirements required to populate this bookshelf are vast, so it has not been widely employed in 
practice but is nevertheless a useful theoretical construct. 
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Figure 2 ?,ǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůŚĞĂůƚŚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ďŽŽŬƐŚĞůĨ ? ?Interventions are funded in order of their net health 
benefit per person (bar height), until the available funds are exhausted (bar widths based on per person 
costs multiplied by the eligible patient population) in order to maximise the health generated from available 
resources. In this example, interventions A to E are included. 
 
As noted in section two, the amount of health sector resources that can be commanded by an HBP is 
determined by its shape (stage three). Specifying what to include in an HBP is likely to sit in between 
the  ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚƚŚĞĨƵůůǇĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŝǀĞ  ‘ďŽŽŬƐŚĞůĨ ?approach, appraising multiple 
interventions and populations in order to allocate a substantial (non-marginal) proportion of health 
sector resources. The consequence of this is that properties of both approaches may be utilised 
when applying CEA methods to HBP design. The set of interventions under consideration should be 
characterised in terms of their population health and cost impact and arranged on ƚŚĞ ‘ďŽŽŬƐŚĞůĨ ? ?
However, as the range of options may not be exhaustive of all health sector expenditure, the 
opportunity cost of including each intervention in the package should also be considered in terms of 
the value of potential other uses of health expenditure external to the HBP. These other uses can 
include investments in infrastructure that in themselves could enable different interventions to be 
delivered under the HBP [29]. 
 
The use of CEA methods in HBP design, therefore, presents some challenges not encountered in the 
methods as typically employed in, for instance, decisions on drug and intervention reimbursement 
made in high income countries. We group these into four categories: section 4.2 covers issues 
around the collection and use of relevant evidence; section 4.3 deals with decision rules; section 4.4 
discusses recent research into modelling additional constraints more common in LMICs; and section 
4.5 discusses the role of uncertainty. 
 
4.2 Relevant evidence 
Conducting CEAs and generating cost-effectiveness evidence is a resource-intensive process. 
Estimating the cost-effectiveness of all of the possible interventions that could be included in an HBP 
may itself not be feasible, or a cost-effective use of resources, for most LMICs. As a result, databases 
of cost-effectiveness evidence that can potentially be used to inform HBPs have been compiled. The 
three most prominent of these are the World Health Organization Cost-Effectiveness program 
(WHO-CHOICE) [30], the Global Health Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry by the Tufts Medical 
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Center [31], and the Disease Control Priorities (DCP) project [32]. Databases dedicated specifically to 
costing estimates, such as the Global Health Cost Consortium [33], can also be utilised. 
 
The outcomes of interest from CEA studies are (i) incremental costs and (ii) incremental health 
effects compared to clear and relevant mutually exclusive alternatives. The cost impacts extend 
beyond treatment costs, and can include any related resource impacts. As these other costs can 
accrue many years after an intervention is delivered, incremental costs can differ markedly from the 
costs of funding an intervention in a given year (an issue discussed in more detail below). Health is 
measured using generic (rather than disease-specific) measures that account for changes to both 
health-related quality of life and survival  W such as the quality-adjusted life year and the disability-
adjusted life year. A more detailed overview of costs and health outcomes is provided in sections A3 
and A4 of the appendix. 
 
The use of these databases in the design of HBPs presents a numbers of issues [34]. Cost-
effectiveness is often summarised in the form of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) and 
not in terms of the incremental health and cost that are used to derive it. The latter are crucial when 
used in the context of an HBP, as they can be combined with patient population figures to estimate 
the expected scale of health generated and costs from each intervention. Other relevant features of 
CEAs that are often not systematically reported in CEA databases include discount rates, time 
horizon and sensitivity analysis results. 
 
Using these cost-effectiveness estimates in HBP design requires an assumption that they are 
generalisable between countries. However, each individual piece of evidence contributing to these 
estimates is specific to the context in which it was produced, and may not be generalizable to the 
health system of interest. This difference could be in the way in which the decision problem is 
characterised: the patient population may differ in disease severity or have a different age profile. 
Cost estimates will also differ between contexts, including when the availability of health services 
(i.e. to treat adverse events or complications) and the costs of different healthcare resources are 
different. These factors can have a considerable impact on the expected population health effect, 
and the use of non-generalisable (biased) results could result in incorrect decisions being made 
about which interventions to include in the HBP of any one jurisdiction. Caution should therefore be 
exercised when considering published cost-effectiveness results, and tools for assessing 
transferability should be used to generate locally relevant estimates, where possible [35], [36].  
 
The scale of the population health impact of an intervention is partly determined by a comparison 
with what those patients would otherwise receive (the comparator(s)). Ɛ ‘ǁŚĂƚpatients would 
otherwise receive ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵcountry to country, the choice of comparator intervention should 
match the situation in the health system of interest. This could depend upon whether the HBP 
specifies an entirely new list of interventions for delivery, or represents an incremental change to an 
existing package. With the former, the relevant comparator will be  ‘no intervention ? (or  ‘ĚŽ
ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? ?tŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ŶĞǁŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐthat would replace one or more that are already 
included in the package should be compared to those rather than  ‘ŶŽŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?. In both cases, 
the new intervention should be the cost-effective option from a set of mutually exclusive 
alternatives (i.e. the one with the highest net health benefit). This can be derived by considering all 
the relevant options alongside one another in a fully incremental analysis (see Appendix A for a 
description of this procedure). 
 
4.3 Decision rules for selecting interventions 
Assessment and collation of relevant evidence will yield a dataset containing information on the set 
of possible interventions to be included in the HBP. For the sole objective of maximising population 
health, three core pieces of information are required for each intervention: incremental benefit, 
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incremental cost, and patient population size.   Incremental benefit and incremental cost should be 
in comparison to the relevant comparator (see above). 
 
The first task is to calculate the cost-effectiveness of each intervention, expressed in terms of net 
health benefit. This measure explicitly incorporates the notion of health opportunity costs, the 
health that could otherwise have been gained by allocating resources elsewhere in the health 
system. An illustration of this process is provided in Table 1. This shows five hypothetical 
interventions, ordered in terms of their net health benefit per person. Health benefits are expressed 
in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) averted and costs are converted into health opportunity costs 
at a rate of $60 per DALY averted. This means that for every $60 spent on the HBP, one DALY could 
be averted if it was spent on other health sector activities. We are able to eliminate intervention E 
entirely from consideration as it results in a reduction in population health at the given level of 
health opportunity cost (i.e. it generates less health than would be generated elsewhere with the 
same resources). Note that this can also be done by removing interventions with an ICER greater 
than $60 per DALY averted, the health opportunity cost threshold ratio noted above. 
 
Table 1: Prioritisation of five hypothetical interventions 
Intervention Comparator Cost 
Health benefit  
(DALY averted) 
ICER Net benefit 
A Do nothing $10 10 $1 9.8 
B Do nothing $25 5 $5 4.2 
C Do nothing $25 1 $25 0.6 
D Do nothing $50 1 $50 0.2 
E Do nothing $25 0.25 $100 -0.2 
Note: All values are expressed per patient; ICER = incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
 
The rate at which any costs associated with an intervention are converted into health opportunity 
costs depends on what type of services could have otherwise been funded with those same 
resources and their impact on health outcomes. This is an empirical problem that can be addressed 
by analyses of  the overall marginal productivity of health systems [37] W[39]. These studies use 
advanced statistical methods that are beyond the scope of this review. However, they suggest that 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĐŽƐƚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ?cost-per-DALY averted is often much lower than levels 
previously recommended by the World Health Organization of 1-3 times GDP per capita. Sets of 
these empirically derived estimates are available for a range of LMICs in Woods et al. [40] and 
Ochalek et al. [38]. 
 
As well as deciding, which interventions do not appear to be a good use of limited resources, it is 
also necessary to clearly determine which interventions should be funded (based on the stated 
objective, in this case health maximisation). For this step, patient population numbers are used to 
scale up benefits and costs, the latter of which can be used to calculate how many interventions can 
be funded from within an overall budget envelope for the HBP.  
 
This process is demonstrated in Table 2 for our previous sample of five (now four) interventions. 
Together, the interventions avert 1,155 DALYs at a cost $20,125. We are now in a position to 
consider the budget constraint  W the limit on health sector resources available to fund the HBP. If we 
suppose this budget constraint is $5,000, then we can maximise population health by fully funding 
both A and B and partially fund C (up to 37%). This would result in a net population health gain of 
1,048 DALYs averted. Intervention D, which has the lowest net health benefits of the four, is not 
allocated any funding. Since further net health benefits would be available by fully funding C & D, 
our analysis also suggests that additional funds should be transferred to the HBP and away from 
other activities in the health system, which have a higher cost-per-DALY averted. 
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Table 2: Population-level impacts of five hypothetical interventions 
Intervention 
Patient 
population 
Cost 
(pp) 
Net benefit 
(pp) 
Cost 
(pop) 
Cumulative 
cost 
Net benefit 
(pop) 
A 50 $10 9.8 $500 $500 490 
B 125 $25 4.2 $3,125 $3,625 525 
C 150 $25 0.6 $3,750 $7,375 90 
D 25 $50 0.2 $1,250 $8,625 5 
Note: pp = per patient; pop = population 
 
In this simple optimisation we have assumed that the per patient cost of each intervention 
represents the annual costs that accrue to the health system, such that the total annual cost of the 
package aligns with its annual budget. However, the cost estimates from CEAs are reported for the 
time horizon of the analysis, which is often lifetime. As such, the intervention costs will be the net 
present (discounted) value of the cumulative costs over the life cycle of the treatment, and cost 
impacts from other health service use (i.e. cost savings from averted complications) can occur many 
years after initiating treatment.  
 
Whilst these are the correct costs to use when generating the rank ordering of interventions, the 
allocation of the HBP budget to those interventions should instead be based on the actual financial 
cost to the health system over a given time period. This may necessitate a separate dedicated 
costing exercise, such as those described by ĂƐŚŝŶĂŶĚPǌĂůƚŦŶ[41]. This can be a complicated task, 
as the delivery of an intervention in one year can result in additional costs (or cost savings) in 
subsequent years. Box 2 describes how these considerations, along with the many previous steps, 
were implemented in an analysis supporting the HBP that featured in the Health Sector Strategic 
Plan for Malawi for 2017-2022. 
 
Box 2: Use of cost-effectiveness methods to inform the Malawian Essential Health Package 
dŽŚĞůƉŝŶĨŽƌŵĂŶƵƉĚĂƚĞŽĨDĂůĂǁŝ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂůƚŚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů,ĞĂůƚŚWĂĐŬĂŐĞ ?,W ? ?
Ochalek and colleagues used cost-effectiveness methods to inform questions relating to intervention 
selection and health system investment [5]. These included the apprŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƐĐĂůĞŽĨƚŚĞ,W ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ďĞƐƚ
ďƵǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ, and the potential value of health system strengthening. 
Information on health sector costs and health outcomes for 67 interventions were extracted from two cost-
effectiveness databases (Tufts Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry and WHO-CHOICE). Each intervention 
was considered relative to what could have been achieved had the money been invested elsewhere in the 
health system. Using evidence-based estimates for Malawi [38], these health opportunities were generated 
at a rate of $61 per DALY averted. The authors then costed a package including all interventions with 
positive net health benefits, using Malawi-specific drug and supply costs to reflect the financial costs to the 
health system. Expected levels of implementation were also calculated based on an analysis of bottlenecks 
in the Malawian healthcare system. 
48 interventions were recommended for inclusion in the EHP, averting 49.5 million DALYs at a total cost of 
$265 million. The total cost is reduced to $67 million when the interventions are partially implemented to 
expected levels. Best buy interventions included HIV prevention strategies, maternal and child health 
interventions, and treatments for malaria and tuberculosis. The health gains associated with increasing 
implementation of the recommended interventions was estimated to be far greater than those that could 
be gained from expanding the package to include more interventions, suggesting that efforts to increase 
implementation levels should be explored. 
The EHP that was ultimately implemented in Malawi was not determined solely on the basis of the CEA 
analysis, and at full implementation still exceed the available Malawian health resources. However, value 
for money was increased: the package was costed at 69% of the previous EHP and was expected to deliver 
92% of the health benefits. 
 
12   CHE Research Paper 165 
 
Whilst our simple example can be conveniently calculated manually, mathematical programming 
approaches can automate the selection of interventions when there are a large number to choose 
from. This can done through linear optimisation algorithms, more details of which can be found in 
Cleary et al [42], or other optimisation algorithms. The algorithms require the specification of an 
objective function and a set of constraints. In our example, the objective function is total population 
health benefit, with a constraint on the total cost. A variety of additional constraints and 
considerations can be incorporated into the mathematical programming approach, and are explored 
in the following section.  
 
4.4 Modelling additional constraints 
Certain features in many health systems may prevent the maximising of population health when 
selecting which health interventions to fund under an HBP. We explore two in this section: (i) ethical 
considerations; and (ii) human resource and health system constraints. 
 
Incorporating equity concerns into CEA typically relates to issues such as health inequalities and 
financial protection, and have been described in a companion policy brief [26]. However, a range of 
additional equity considerations can also be directly incorporated into the optimisation framework 
described above in the form of constraints. For instance, the analysis in our stylised example (Table 
2) recommended partially funding intervention C to maximise population net benefit. This 
systematic underfunding of a health intervention may be deemed unacceptable on equity grounds 
(e.g. horizontal equity by which all individuals with a condition should receive the same treatment 
may make the partial provision of it unacceptable). Adding an integer constraint such that an 
intervention must be provided at 100% or not at all would mean the algorithm would instead 
advocate intervention D. tĞŵĂǇĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞůǇŽƉƚĨŽƌĂ ‘ĚĞĐĞŶƚŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ?ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂůů
patients receive treatment of some description, even if this means sacrificing the cost-effective 
option in order to fund less costly treatments with greater coverage [42].  
 
Non-financial capacity constraints are also likely to be present within the health system, and will 
limit the extent to which interventions can implemented. These can occur where access to services 
may be limited or there is lack of critical assets such as human resources or facilities. The framework 
described in the previous section can be used to place a value on relieving these constraints, by 
using the patient population of the expected  ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ?ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶůĞǀĞůƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂ
ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů ‘ĨƵůů ?ůĞǀĞů [43]. The difference in net health benefit between the  ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ?levels and the 
full level can be used to help answer the question of whether health sector resources (including part 
of the HBP budget) could be better spent on relaxing these constraints and increasing 
implementation. 
 
An example of this analysis is shown in Table 3, as applied to the hypothetical case from previous 
examples. The actual implementation levels are used to calculate the difference in DALYs averted 
between each intervention at actual and full levels of implementation. Across interventions, this 
equates to 1,475 DALYs averted. The economic value (at a rate of $60 per DALY averted) of achieving 
full implementation across interventions is therefore $88,500. This provides an estimate of the 
upper limit of spending on achieving full implementation that would be a cost-effective use of health 
sector resources.  
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Table 3: Value to the health care system of scaling up interventions to full implementation 
A B C D E F 
Intervention DALYs at 
actual imp. 
Actual imp. 
level 
DALYs at full 
imp. 
[B * 1/C] 
Full vs actual 
imp. 
[D  W B] 
Value of actual to full 
imp. 
[E * $60] 
A 490 50% 980 490 $29,400 
B 525 75% 700 175 $10,500 
C 90 10% 900 810 $48,600 
D 5 100% 5 0 $0 
Note: DALYs = disability-adjusted life years; imp = implementation 
 
Analysing the cost-effectiveness of relaxing specific constraints within health systems is an area of 
active research. Theoretical approaches have been developed for a number of constraints, including 
human resources constraints and supply of labour [44], [45]; healthcare facilities [29]; and health 
system strengthening interventions that increase the effectiveness of multiple interventions at once 
(i.e. training programmes) [46]. However, few practical applications of these approaches have so far 
been published. 
 
4.5 Uncertainty 
The inputs used to generate cost-effectiveness evidence are all inherently uncertain. Analyses 
supporting HBP design should reflect the potential impacts of this uncertainty. A simple approach to 
assessing the potential implications of uncertainty is to conduct deterministic sensitivity analysis, in 
which inputs or assumptions can be varied to examine the impacts on the cost-effectiveness results 
[47]. For example, varied inputs could include intervention cost, coverage rate, or target population 
size. These methods require a judgement on the likely range of uncertainty for each input, in order 
to produce an informative deterministic sensitivity analysis as the bounds are explicitly set by the 
analyst.  
 
An alternative approach known as probabilistic sensitivity analysis varies all the inputs 
simultaneously. This involves assigning a probability distribution to each input; a set of values are 
drawn from these distributions and the analysis is rerun to estimate a new set of results. This 
process is then repeated many times. The results of each iteration are stored and can be used to 
quantify uncertainty in the results. In the context of an HBP, for instance, we would be able to 
estimate the probability that a particular intervention should be included in the benefits package 
[47]. This tests the overall robustness of the results and quantifies the degree to which results are 
reliable. The probabilistic analysis requires more data, such as information that can be used to 
define the probability distribution attached to each uncertain input.  
 
The principal purpose of quantifying uncertainty is to help inform decision making. As well as yes/no 
decisions on interventions to include in an HBP, policy makers can also be required to assess 
uncertainty, and have the scope to recommend that available resources be used to fund research 
that reduces uncertainty and make better future decisions about which interventions to include in 
the package. Value of information (VOI) analysis is a quantitative approach that explores whether 
additional research is a worthwhile investment [42]. The core idea behind VOI is to explore the 
opportunity cost of research spending: whether the expected reduction in uncertainty from 
acquiring new evidence will justify its expenditure or would be better spent elsewhere. For an 
introductory overview to VOI, see Wilson [48]. 
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5. Conclusion 
This report summarises some of the key considerations and analytical approaches that can be 
utilised when designing and implementing an HBP. Good governance structures and an analysis of 
the political economy of the setting of the HBP can help health planners navigate the political and 
social barriers to implementation, whilst the tools of economic evaluation and cost-effectiveness 
analysis provide important evidence that aids the selection of the best possible set of interventions. 
These aspects fall under key stages in the HBP management cycle, a comprehensive set of processes 
that can help to ensure the efficiency, acceptability and sustainability of the HBP over time.  
 
Although cost-effectiveness evidence is frequently claimed to have informed HBPs, rigorous and 
appropriate uses of these methods are still rare. This is in part due to CEA having been developed 
and applied to incremental (or marginal) decisions rather than to the more complex scenario of HBP 
design. This leaves scope for future research to improve the validity of cost-effectiveness evidence 
for HBP design, for instance through applied case studies investigating the effects of health system 
constraints or uncertainty. 
 
It is also important to place cost-effectiveness evidence in its proper context within the HBP design 
process. The validity and reliability of the cost-effectiveness evidence is likely to be reduced in LMIC 
settings, where evidence generated from external health systems, with questionable transferability, 
is more likely to be used. The technical methods discussed in this brief should, therefore, be used to 
guide policy decision-making rather than automate it. This type of deliberative process forms a 
critical part of the HBP process and is a feature of many institutions that utilise cost-effectiveness 
evidence in some capacity. Decision-making committees can deliberate as to whether an 
intervention should be included in the package given the level of uncertainty in the technical 
analysis, the transferability of the evidence underpinning the technical analysis, as well as important 
ethical and political considerations.  
 
HBPs are now seen as a methodical, transparent and explicit vehicle for improving the provision of 
healthcare to those with the highest need around the world. Utilising the insights of political and 
economic analysis that are highlighted in this brief can help to achieve this objective.  
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x M. Drummond, M. J. Sculpher, K. Claxton, G. L. Stoddart, and G. W. Torrance, Methods for 
the Economic Evaluation of Health Care Programmes, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
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Using Cost-ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚŽ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚĞŶĞĨŝƚƐWůĂŶĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝŶtŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶ ?tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
out? Designing Benefits for Universal Health Coverage, A. Glassman, U. Giedion, and P. 
Smith, Eds. Washington DC: Center for Global Development, 2017. 
 
Uncertainty in cost effectiveness 
 
x H. Briggs, M. C. Weinstein, E. A. L. Fenwick, J. Karnon, M. J. Sculpher, and A. D. Paltiel, 
 “DŽĚĞůWĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚhŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?Med. Decis. Mak., vol. 32, no. 5, 
pp. 722 W732, Sep. 2012. 
 
Health system constraints 
 
x W ?ǀĂŶĂĂů ? ?DŽƌƚŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ: ?> ?^ĞǀĞƌĞŶƐ ? “,ĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞŝŶƉƵƚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐĂŶĚĐŽƐƚ-
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƌƵůĞƐ ? ?Soc. Sci. Med., vol. 200, no. August 2017, pp. 59 W64, 
2018. 
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health care resources in modelling and cost-effectiveness studies  ?  The example of viral 
ůŽĂĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚĐĂƌĞ ? ?PLoS One, pp. 1 W13, 2018. 
 
x K. Hauck et al. ? “,ŽǁĐĂŶǁĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽƐƚ-effectiveness of health system 
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐ ?ƚǇƉŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Soc. Sci. Med., vol. 220, pp. 141 W149, 2019. 
 
Health opportunity costs 
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2018. 
 
Health benefits package design 
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Benefits for Universal Health Coverage. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.  
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Appendix  ? Primer on cost-effectiveness analysis 
A1. Introduction 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a form of economic evaluation that seeks to estimate the benefits and 
costs of different courses of action. In health care, it is used to estimate the health and resource 
impacts of health interventions. The objective is to provide evidence for decisions regarding the 
allocation of scarce health resources, and it has been a frequently used approach in health policy 
decision-making since the 1990s. 
 
In fields outside of health, the most common form of economic evaluation is cost-benefit analysis. 
Under this approach, all outcomes of interest are converted into monetary units and compared with 
the costs [49]. However, the application of cost-benefit analysis to healthcare interventions is 
frequently cited as inappropriate, due to market failures in the demand and supply for health and 
healthcare, and the challenges of valuing health monetarily [50]. This has led to cost-effectiveness 
analysis, which typically evaluates interventions in terms of their health impacts, emerging as the 
predominant form of economic evaluation in the health sector. 
 
This primer will cover four principal issues that present when planning a cost-effectiveness analysis: 
(i) the decision problem; (ii) outcomes; (iii) costs; and (iv) decision rules. For a more comprehensive 
overview of each topic and economic evaluation in health care more generally, see Drummond et al. 
[27]. 
 
A2. Decision problem 
The decision problem is the specific research question that the analysis is seeking to address. For a 
given intervention, the two core components of the decision problem are the population and 
comparators. The population is typically the group of patients who will receive the intervention if it 
is introduced, which may be split into relevant subgroups (based on their disease severity, for 
instance).  
 
The choice of comparator(s) to be included in an evaluation is not simply the best option currently 
available, but should include all the existing ways in which the population being considered may be 
treated  W ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?Ăůů ‘ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŽƉƚŝŽŶƐďĞŝŶŐ
considered are mutually exclusive, in so far as providing one will preclude providing any of the 
others. Comparators can range from doing nothing to alternative interventions to a complex 
sequence of interventions. The costs and outcomes described in the following sections are 
estimated incrementally  W how much more (or less) benefit and cost an intervention imposes, 
relative to what is currently done. This reflects the decision-making context faced in the high-income 
countries where health economic evaluation was initially developed. 
 
A3. Outcomes 
Given the objective of health maximisation with the cost-effectiveness analysis framework, the 
outcome of interest is naturally a measure of health. Resulting from the need to be able to compare 
investments in interventions across different areas, a generic measure of health is needed, ideally 
one which incorporates information on two components: length of life and quality of life. This has 
led to the development of generic measures of health that quantify health-adjusted life years 
(HALYs), in which each year of life is adjusted downwards according to the level of morbidity 
experience during it. Two are commonly used in practice: the quality-adjusted life year and the 
disability-adjusted life year. These are illustrated graphically in Figure A1. 
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Figure A1: The relationship between quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and disability-adjusted life years 
(DALYs). QALYs represent years of healthy life gained, whereas DALYs represent the gap between years lived 
in perfect health and years lived in less-than-perfect health 
 
Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) are estimated using self-reported multi-attribute health 
questionnaires. Each specific combination of responses represents a health state, to which a pre-
determined health related quality of life weight is assigned. These weights are derived from 
preference elicitation studies conducted in the population of interest, and are anchored at 1 for 
perfect health and 0 for dead. In England, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence in 
England uses the EQ-5D questionnaire, which measures five dimensions of health: pain/discomfort, 
anxiety/depression, self-care, usual activities and mobility. A patient reporting moderate problems 
on all these dimensions for an entire year will be assigned 0.516 QALYs [51].  
 
Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) are calculated based on the presence of a disease or disease 
sequelae. DALYs have been more widely used in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). As with 
QALYs, a set of estimated weights are attached to each disability state; however, contrary to QALYs, 
the weight represents the loss in health-related quality of life. An episode of severe diarrhoea, for 
example, has an associated weight of 0.247. This (and all other episodes of morbidity) will be 
ƐƵďƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨůŝĨĞƚŽĚĞƌŝǀĞƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ-adjusted length of life. The 
difference between this and ƐŽŵĞŵĂǆŝŵƵŵ ‘ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ůŝĨĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂŶĐǇ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞƚŽĂůŚĞĂůƚŚůŽƐƐĚƵĞ
ƚŽŵŽƌďŝĚŝƚǇĂŶĚƉƌĞŵĂƚƵƌĞŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ>zƐůŽƐƚ ?
 
An intervention that improves health will, therefore, result in a gain in QALYs but will avert DALYs, as 
the latter is a measure of health loss. In subsequent examples we will not subscribe to either 
measure, and instead refer to generic health measures as health-adjusted life years. 
 
A4. Costs 
The relevant costs to consider within a cost-effectiveness analysis go beyond the financial costs 
required to directly fund the interventions under consideration. Introducing a new intervention may 
impose additional costs on the health sector (and other public sectors), and can have private cost 
implications for patients and their families or affect the economic productivity of patients. 
 
From an economic perspective, costs are significant because they represent lost opportunities to 
invest the resources in other activities. In the economic evaluation of health interventions, these 
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opportunity costs can be quantified in terms of the health that could otherwise have been gained if 
the resources were used for other purposes. The rate at which costs are converted into health 
opportunity costs depends on productivity of the health system: more productive systems will have 
greater opportunity costs, as the alternative uses will generate more health. Research into health 
system marginal productivity has been an active area of research since 2015 [37] W[39]. 
 
Decisions about which costs to include are determined by the perspective of the analysis. The health 
sector perspective is commonly used and includes treatment costs and other health service use. The 
broadest perspective is the societal perspective, which includes all costs to society, including for 
example, private costs and productivity gains/losses. In order to maintain consistency between 
benefits and costs, any impacts estimated for the intervention should also be reflected on the 
opportunity cost side as well. For example, if an intervention generates productivity gains, then the 
productivity gains that could be otherwise generated by alternative interventions should also be 
accounted for.  
 
Measuring the overall cost impact requires estimates of (i) the quantity of resources consumed and 
(ii) the monetary value of a unit of each resource (i.e. a bed day in hospital or GP visit). Quantities of 
resource use may be available from a variety of sources, for example, case records, administrative 
data or patient surveys. Monetary valuations can be obtained from market prices, although the 
market imperfections in healthcare mean that these should be treated cautiously. Reimbursement 
tariffs for hospitals can be used for pricing services where available. The cost of health sector 
workers should include overheads and training costs, in addition to salary costs. 
 
A5. Decision rules 
The evidence on costs and outcomes is then combined to create measures of cost-effectiveness. A 
simple summary measure is the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER): the incremental costs of 
an intervention compared to a comparator, divided by the incremental benefits.  
 ܫܥܧܴ ൌ ܥ݋ݏݐூ௡௧ െ ܥ݋ݏݐ஼௢௠௣ܪ݈݁ܽݐ݄ூ௡௧ െܪ݈݁ܽݐ݄஼௢௠௣ 
 
In a hypothetical situation in which the ICERs of all potential interventions were known, 
interventions would be funded in order from lowest (most favourable cost-effectiveness) to highest 
(least favourable cost-effectiveness) until healthcare resources were exhausted [52].  
 
This type of approach is infeasible, from a practical perspective, in many of the high-income 
countries that have formally introduced cost-effectiveness analysis into healthcare decision-making. 
Instead, the approach has been to evaluate measures of cost-effectiveness with respect to a decision 
rule, from which it can be said that the intervention is likely to be cost-effective or not. This is 
broadly defined as the benefits outweighing the opportunity costs. When a health sector perspective 
is adopted, this means that the health benefits are greater than what would have otherwise have 
been funded.  
 
A widely used method for determining the cost-effective intervention from a set of mutually 
ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂ ‘ĨƵůůǇŝŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐ
of paiƌǁŝƐĞĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ĂŶǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ‘ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ?ďǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ W that 
it is more costly and less effective  W is removed from the range of options. The remaining options are 
then organised from least to most costly, as demonstrated for four alternatives in Table A1 
(interventions X, Y and Z and placebo).  
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Table A1: Fully incremental analysis of three mutually exclusive options 
   
ICER 
Comparator Incremental cost 
Incremental 
HALYs 
vs Placebo vs X vs Y 
Placebo - - - - - 
X $5,635 0.35 $16,100 - - 
Y $6,954 0.375 $18,544 $52,760 - 
Z| $12,589 0.725 $17,364 $18,544 $16,100 
Note: Incremental costs and HALYs are calculated relative to placebo 
 
An ICER is calculated for the least costly vs next least costly and compared to a threshold ratio 
representing the cost-per-HALY of what could otherwise have been funded (i.e the health 
opportunity cost). If the ICER is below the threshold ratio, more health is gained from the 
intervention than from other uses. If the ratio is above the threshold, the additional costs from the 
(more costly) intervention could have provided more health if spent on other activities. 
 
The fully incremental analysis in Table A1, assuming a threshold ratio of $20,000 per HALY, finds that 
Z is the cost-effective option. First, placebo is eliminated in a comparison with X with an ICER of 
$16,100. Y is eliminated in a comparison with X as the ICER is well above $20,000 (at $52,760), and 
the comparison between X and Z yields an ICER of under $20,000 (at $18,544). 
 
Cost-effectiveness can alternatively be expressed as net health benefit or net monetary benefit. 
These statistics use the same information as the ICER and directly incorporate the threshold ratio 
into the equation to account for health opportunity costs. For net health benefit (NHB), the 
incremental costs are converted into health opportunity costs by dividing through by the threshold 
ratio (ߣ): 
 ܰܪܤ ൌ ሺܪ݈݁ܽݐ݄ூ௡௧ െܪ݈݁ܽݐ݄஼௢௠௣ሻ െ ሺܥ݋ݏݐூ௡௧ െ ܥ݋ݏݐ஼௢௠௣ሻߣ  
 
NHB therefore calculates the expected net improvement in HALYs from adopting the intervention. 
Net monetary benefit instead multiplies the health changes by the threshold ratio, calculating the 
net monetary value of the health benefits:  
 ܰܯܤ ൌ ሺܪ݈݁ܽݐ݄ூ௡௧ െ ܪ݈݁ܽݐ݄஼௢௠௣ሻߣ െ ሺܥ݋ݏݐூ௡௧ െ ܥ݋ݏݐ஼௢௠௣ሻ 
 
Both NHB and NMB are mathematically equivalent, with interventions being cost-effective if the net 
benefit is greater than zero. Table A2 recreates the cost-effectiveness summary of Table A1 using 
NHB instead of the ICER. 
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Table A2: Fully incremental analysis of three mutually exclusive options using net health benefit 
   
Net health benefit 
Comparator Incremental cost 
Incremental 
HALYs 
vs Placebo vs X vs Y 
Placebo - - - - - 
X $5,635 0.35 0.068 - - 
Y $6,954 0.375 0.027 -0.041 - 
Z| $12,589 0.725 0.096 0.027 0.068 
 
A6. Conclusion 
This primer has described some of the central concepts and procedures of cost-effectiveness 
analysis. A considerable number of important features and discussion points relating to the 
approach were not covered. For example, the way in which uncertainty can be characterised and 
incorporated into the decision-making framework has been omitted. For a detailed discussion, see 
Claxton et al. [53]. Similarly, we have not discussed some of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying the fully incremental analysis procedure or the approaches for identifying and 
synthesizing relevant evidence (overviews of which can be found in Drummond et al. [27]). Readers 
with an interest in developing a deeper understanding of economic evaluation are encouraged to 
refer to these resources.  
 
 
